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Cooperation Between Financial Intelligence Units in the EU: Stuck in the Middle Between the 
GDPR and the Police Data Protection Directive 
 
Organised crime, corruption and fraud (to name a few) generate significant amounts of 
wealth. We are all familiar with the occasional movie scene, where a renowned drug dealer 
resorts to burying thousands upon thousands of banknotes in their yard – but, as useful as that 
may be for hiding the money, it is of little help when one wants to spend it. Criminals who 
accumulate wealth cannot safely enjoy the proceeds of their efforts unless they ‘launder’ it first. 
In other words, they need to disguise the illegal origin of their proceeds – or else, they will 
attract the attention of law enforcement. The good news for those who are trying to launder 
their money is that, in today’s globalised world, money flows across borders with the touch of 
a button; they have plenty of opportunities to integrate their illicit proceeds into the financial 
system and successfully distance their funds from the underlying crime. For law enforcement 
officials, however, who are on the trail of ‘dirty’ money, this is anything but good news; money 
travels easily, but they don’t. As such, the raison d’ etre of anti-money laundering (AML) 
regimes around the world, largely modelled after the Recommendations of the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), is to make money movements visible and therefore enable law enforcement 
to trace them.  
The EU entered the anti-money laundering race in 1991, with the adoption of a 
Directive ‘on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering’.1 More than two decades and five Directives later,2 the EU’s anti-money laundering 
regime has evolved significantly – always in line with the FATF Recommendations.3 To make 
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money movements traceable, the regime introduced a series of preventive measures, largely 
based on the collection of information by the regulated sector. Perhaps the most drastic among 
them is the obligation to report suspicious transactions. This led to the emergence of an 
institutional machinery4 that is responsible for administering the surveillance of money 
movements at the national level.5 Partly because of the preventive nature of this regime and 
partly because the EU lacked competence in criminal matters at the time,6 this was not assigned 
to the ‘traditional’ policing sector,7 but special agencies were set up for this role.8 These ‘new 
policing’ institutions became known as Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).9 Upon receipt of 
suspicious transaction reports, they analyse them and, if need be, disseminate the results of their 
analysis to law enforcement authorities or their counterparts in the EU and beyond. They are, 
in other words, the EU’s financial intelligence hubs - nestled between the reporting and law 
enforcement sectors.10 And, just as their partners from the reporting sector, they handle massive 
amounts of personal data every day.  
The operation of FIUs has brought about many a challenges for data protection. This 
article, however, focuses solely on those raised by the exchange of information between them. 
After all, a large part of their day to day activities rests on the transnational arena. Why? Because 
reporting suspicious transactions would bring about scarce results in a world where money flows 
easily across borders, but information about money flows doesn’t. This article begins by setting 
out the legal framework that governs FIU cooperation in the EU. It then moves on to examine 
the present-day uncertainty over the data protection framework that governs their 
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(co)operation, and namely whether this subject to the General Data Protection Regulation, or 
to its law enforcement counterpart, the Police Data Protection Directive. The remaining of the 
article focuses on the ‘FIU.net’ – the decentralised network for information exchanges between 
EU FIUs – and on the data protection challenges that emerged from its recent integration into 
Europol.   
Ultimately, what this article seeks to illustrate is that data protection has always been an 
afterthought in the context of FIU cooperation. Operational needs have always preceded and 
surpassed data protection considerations, resulting in a framework that poses significant 
challenges for the protection of personal data.     
 
Data Transfers Between Financial Intelligence Units in the EU 
 
The Evolution of the Legal Framework on FIU Cooperation  
 
When the First AML Directive was adopted, criminal matters were beyond the scope of 
Community competence, so the EU legislator refrained from prescribing any details about the 
‘authorities responsible for combatting money laundering’11 (as FIUs were described at the time) 
and there was no mention of their cooperation. The FATF Recommendations were also silent 
on the matter. Be that as it may, the initial indifference of the FATF towards FIUs did not last 
for long; it eventually broke its silence over FIUs when it updated its Recommendations in 
200312 and has been engaged with them ever-since.13 Needless to say, the EU legislator followed 
suit. Article 21 of the Third AML Directive mirrored the FATF Recommendation almost to 
the letter; Member States should establish an FIU ‘responsible for receiving (and to the extent 
permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of 
information which concern potential money laundering, potential terrorist financing or are 
required by national legislation or regulation.’14 That said, the Third Directive hardly dealt with 
the issue of FIU cooperation – with the exception of article 38, which placed the Commission 
under a duty to facilitate the coordination efforts of FIUs.15 This light-touch approach was 
 
11 Article 6, First AML Directive. 
12 FATF, ‘The Forty Recommendations’ (2003), Recommendations 13, 26, 31 and Interpretative Note to 
Recommendation 26. 
13 FATF, Recommendation 26 (2003).  
14 Article 21(2), Third AML Directive.  
15 Article 38, Third AML Directive.  
similar to the FATF’s at the time: Recommendation 31 merely called upon countries to ensure 
that their FIUs have effective mechanisms of cooperation in place.16  
In the absence of detailed EU - or international – rules on FIUs for the better part of the  
regime’s first decade, the Member States enjoyed ample discretion in choosing the model and 
powers of their respective FIUs.17 As a result, when one looks at FIUs in the EU, a picture of 
diversity emerges; a series of administrative, police, judicial and ‘hybrid’ authorities, all sharing 
a common mandate, make up the EU’s financial intelligence infrastructure. Most FIUs (twenty-
one in total) have been established under an administrative or police model.18 Five (those of 
Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Hungary and the Netherlands)19 blend characteristics from multiple 
models and so are classified as hybrid, whereas only one (Luxembourg) belongs to the judicial-
type category.20 Yet, this diversity initially created significant difficulties for the exchange of 
information between them.21 In the course of the ‘90s, administrative FIUs could not share data 
with law enforcement or judicial FIUs - and vice versa.22  
This problem was not unique to the EU, so it wasn’t long before FIUs took the matter into 
their hands. The first coordinated attempt to overcome these obstacles took place in 1995, while 
the anti-money laundering regime was still at its infancy. In the summer of that year, a number 
of FIUs from around the world came together at the Egmont-Arenberg Palace in Brussels and 
formed what became known as the Egmont Group - a transgovernmental network of FIUs, 
whose priority was to stimulate cross-border cooperation between FIUs.23 Over the past twenty-
five years this network (who currently counts 164 FIU members) developed numerous standards 
aiming to facilitate the exchange of information between FIUs worldwide.24 I mention this 
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development, because the Egmont Group’s standards have influenced the Union’s legal 
framework on FIUs to a significant degree (and continue to do so), much like the FATF has 
influenced the EU’s anti money laundering regime as a whole.  
By the time the Egmont Group was established, it had become apparent that only an EU-
wide legal framework on FIU cooperation could address the obstacles to information sharing. 
Provisions on cross-border cooperation between FIUs, however, could not be incorporated into 
the existing AML Directive; this was a ‘first pillar’ measure and the EU could not regulate FIUs 
via the ‘first pillar’, because their conduct was viewed as a penal matter.25 The solution came 
about in 2000, in the form a ‘third pillar’ Council Decision on FIU cooperation.26 The latter, 
which covered information exchanges solely for the purposes of anti-money laundering and not 
counter-terrorist financing, called for FIU cooperation regardless of the differences in their 
institutional model.27 As the Commission observed, this Decision was designed to reflect the 
principles developed by the Egmont Group.28 Despite its reduced scope, this Council Decision 
(which was recently repealed)29 governed the cooperation between EU FIUs for two decades. 
It also provided the incentive30 for the creation of the FIU.net, a decentralised computer 
network that enables the exchange of information between FIUs in the EU up to this day.31 
Even after the adoption of the Council Decision, information exchanges between FIUs in 
the EU continued to suffer from numerous shortcomings.32 Advocate General Bot aptly 
summarised those in the Jyske Bank Gibraltar case. As  he  observed, while the intention of the 
Council Decision was to harmonise FIU cooperation in the Union, the rules nonetheless 
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remained ‘minimal in nature’ and allowed Member States ‘a significant degree of discretion as 
regards the extent of their cooperation’.33 In response to the repeated calls at the EU level to 
strengthen FIU cooperation34 and propelled by the FATF’s reviewed Recommendations of 
2012 which expanded the FIU-related provision significantly,35 the Fourth Directive was the 
first in the long line of anti-money laundering Directives to deal with FIU cooperation in 
detail.36  
A few months later, however, FIU cooperation came once more at the forefront of the 
legislative agendas – where it was to stay for years to come. The circumstances that led up to 
this development are particularly sad. In 2016, a series of terrorist attacks sent shockwaves 
through the Union. Inevitably, these events resuscitated EU policymakers’ interest in counter-
terrorist financing. So, it wasn’t long before the Council called on the Commission to present 
proposals to ‘strengthen, harmonise and improve the powers of, and the cooperation between 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIU's), notably through the proper embedment of the FIU.net 
network for information exchange in Europol (….)’. The Council wasn’t alone; the 
Commission made similar calls, both through the European Agenda on a Security and the 
Action Plan against terrorist financing.37 In light of this, it should not come as a surprise that the 
Commission tabled a proposal to amend the Fourth AML Directive in 2016.38 And so there 
were Five.  
But the evolution of the Union’s legal framework on FIU cooperation didn’t stop there. It 
seems that, after all those years of inactivity, the EU legislator’s decision to deal with this 
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complex issue opened up a can of worms; cooperation between FIUs in the EU always seems 
to fall short in the eyes of policymakers.39 In fact, while these developments were unfolding, the 
EU FIUs Platform was conducting a study of the obstacles to FIUs’ access to and exchange of 
information.40 In response to this study, the Commission published in 2018 a proposal for a 
Directive which aimed, among other things, to facilitate FIU cooperation.41  
This Directive, which lays down rules ‘facilitating the use of financial and other information 
for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences’ was 
adopted in June 2019 and it repealed the above-mentioned 2000 Council Decision on FIU 
cooperation.42 What is more interesting, however, is that the Directive was adopted in under 
the legal basis provided for by Article 87(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, which enables the EU to put forward measures regarding the collection, storage and 
exchange of information and common investigative techniques in relation to the detection of 
serious forms of organised crime, with the aim of establishing police cooperation between the 
Member States’ competent authorities in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation 
of criminal offences. The Commission considers this legal basis to be appropriate, despite the 
fact that not all Member States have given police status to their FIUs.43 What is more interesting, 
however, is that the Preamble of the Directive calls on the Commission to assess ‘in the near 
future’ whether the establishment of a coordination mechanism, such as an ‘EU FIU’ would be 
an appropriate measure to strengthen the cooperation of EU FIUs.44 The latest Action Plan ‘for 
a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorist financing’ indeed 
considers the establishment of such a mechanism and indicates that the Commission will table a 
proposal to that end in 2021.45 With that in mind, let us take a closer look at the current legal 
framework on the cooperation between EU FIUs.  
 
 
39 Commission, ‘On improving Cooperation between EU Financial Intelligence Units’, SWD (2017) 275 final.  
40 EU FIUs Platform (n 18).  
41 COM (2018) 213 final (n 29). 
42 Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 laying down rules 
facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of 
certain criminal offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA, [2019] OJ L 186/122 (hereafter 
Directive 2019/1153).   
43 Commission, ‘Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council laying down rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, 
detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA’ 
SWD (2018) 115 final, 24.  
44 Preamble, para 22, Directive 2019/1153.  
45 Commission, ‘Action Plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorist 
financing’ C (2020) 2800 final, 10 – 12. 
The current legal framework on FIU cooperation  
 
The Fourth AML Directive calls on Member States to ensure that ‘FIUs cooperate with 
each other to the greatest extent possible, regardless of their organisational status’.46 In particular, 
they must ‘exchange, spontaneously or upon request, any information that may be relevant for 
the processing or analysis of information by the FIU related to money laundering or terrorist 
financing (…)’.47 Importantly, this Article gives effect to the data protection principle of purpose 
limitation in the specific context of FIU cooperation, and it does so in a twofold manner.48 First, 
personal data between EU FIUs must be exchanged only if the purpose of the exchange is the 
analysis of that information by the recipient FIU. This means that the data cannot be used in 
support of an investigation or prosecution – unless, as we will see, the recipient FIU obtains the 
prior consent of its counterpart. Maintaining this distinction sounds simple enough – but alas, 
there is a fly in the ointment; some EU FIUs tend to blur the lines between analysis and 
investigation – a blurring which clearly undermines the principle of purpose limitation.49 
Second, personal data is to be exchanged only if the analysis focuses on possible money 
laundering or terrorist financing cases – and no other criminality. In practice this means that, 
when filing a request, the FIU must demonstrate that it needs this information to pursue a 
potential money laundering or terrorist financing case. This requirement, however, was recently 
relaxed with the adoption of the Directive law enforcement access to financial information.50 
This Directive, which includes a limited number of provisions on FIU cooperation, calls on 
Member States to ensure ‘that in exceptional and urgent cases, their FIUs are entitled to 
exchange financial information or financial analysis that may be relevant for the processing or 
analysis of information related to terrorism or organised crime associated with terrorism’.51 We 
see, therefore, two further categories added here: terrorism and organized crime associated with 
terrorism.  
Aside from the possibility of spontaneous dissemination described above (where FIUs enjoy 
a certain level of discretion) there is one instance where they are obliged to share information 
with their EU counterparts, even in the absence of a specific request. This is when they receive 
a suspicious transaction report that is relevant to another Member State. In this case, they must 
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promptly share it with the FIU of that other Member State.52 The justification behind this newly 
introduced requirement is that, at times, a suspicious transaction report may contain information 
that concerns a Member State other than the one that receives it. Let us take the companies that 
operate under the freedom to provide services as an example; these companies are established in 
one Member State but operate throughout the EU. But pursuant to the territorial principle that 
underpins reporting obligations, obliged entities must file a report to ‘the FIU of the Member 
State in whose territory the obliged entity transmitting the information is established’.53 This 
sometimes leads in a situation where the FIU of the Member State where the suspicious activity 
takes place does not receive the information, whereas the FIU that does receive it cannot do 
much about it, since it concerns events that occurred in a different Member State. Article 53(1) 
of the Directive seeks to rectify this loophole, although it is important to note that it represents 
a move towards a ‘data sharing by default’ attitude.  
In line with the FATF and  Egmont Group standards,54 the Directive also provides that 
when responding to requests from their EU counterparts, FIUs may employ the whole range of 
the powers that are available to them domestically.55 For instance, an FIU may contact a national 
bank to request an individual’s financial records in order to respond to an EU counterpart’s 
request. It doesn’t have to be an obliged entity though; the FIU may consult one of the many 
domestic databases at its disposal. This means that the (very wide) range of powers that FIUs 
enjoy at the national level can now be activated for the benefit of their EU counterparts. More 
importantly, it also means that the pool of information that is available to EU FIUs has been 
expanded significantly. Operationally that might sound optimal, but this broadly framed 
obligation raises significant questions about the content of the requests. Article 53(1) of the 
Directive provides limited guidance in that regard: ‘[A] request shall contain the relevant facts, 
background information, reasons for the request and how the information sought will be used’. 
Still, several issues remain unanswered. What constitutes sufficient justification in the context of 
a request? Should such requests be based on corroborated suspicion or should a lower threshold 
of suspicion suffice? Should the receiving FIU assess the validity of its counterparts’ suspicion? 
What happens if a request is not sufficiently justified? These are valid questions – the answers to 
which entail significant consequences for the rights to privacy and data protection. Perhaps 
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unsurprisingly, the EU FIUs Platform56 has suggested that assessing the validity of their 
counterparts’ suspicion before FIUs activate their domestic powers on their behalf ‘may go 
against the principle of “mutual recognition” of suspicions among EU FIUs’.57 Indeed, a recent 
survey revealed that while some EU FIUs require ‘adequately motivated requests’ before they 
activate their domestic powers, they nonetheless do not second-guess their EU counterparts’ 
suspicion.58 
In all forms of FIU cooperation highlighted above, the EU legislator has ensured that the 
obstacles to information exchange are kept at a minimum. The instances where an EU FIU may 
refuse to cooperate with its EU counterpart also reflect this approach; according to Article 53(3) 
of the Directive, ‘[A]n FIU may refuse to exchange information only in exceptional 
circumstances where the exchange could be contrary to fundamental principles of its national 
law. Those exceptions shall be specified in a way which prevents misuse of, and undue 
limitations on, the free exchange of information for analytical purposes’.  
The EU legislator may be promoting a model of maximum information exchange between 
EU FIUs, but that does not mean that FIUs can use the information they receive from their 
counterparts as they wish. Above we saw that, pursuant to the principle of purpose limitation, 
FIUs must only use information in support of their tasks. This applies to exchanged information 
as well.59 But that is not the only limitation. Firstly, Article 54 stipulates that the transmitting 
FIU may impose restrictions to the use of the exchanged information - restrictions which the 
receiving FIU is expected to comply with. Secondly, the Directive specifies that exchanged 
information must be ‘used only for the purpose for which it was sought or provided’ and that 
any further use or dissemination of the exchanged information to the national authorities is 
subject to prior consent by the providing FIU.60 If the recipient FIU requests the consent of the 
transmitting FIU to share the exchanged information with, say, a prosecutor, the latter must 
give that consent as promptly and freely as possible.61 In a provision that mirrors the Egmont 
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Group’s standards almost to the letter,62 the Directive provides that the only cases where an FIU 
may refuse to consent is when 
a) the planned dissemination falls outside the scope of application of the AML/CTF provisions 
b) it could impair an investigation and finally 
c) it could violate the fundamental principles of national law of the Member State where the 
requested FIU is situated.63  
Last but not least, the Fourth anti-money laundering Directive introduced a form of FIU 
cooperation that far exceeds information exchange. Pursuant to Article 51, the EU FIUs 
Platform shall assist FIUs with the joint analysis of cross-border cases. The Directive does not 
provide any guidance on what constitutes joint analysis or how it should be conducted, but its 
potential has not gone unobserved. On the contrary; FIUs have been working intensely, under 
the umbrella of the EU FIUs Platform, to develop ‘new ways for FIUs to work together to have 
a common output at the end – with actionable outcome’.64   
 
The FIU.net 
 
In the previous section, we saw that pursuant to the anti-money laundering Directive, 
FIUs in the EU cooperate by: 
a) spontaneously sharing, at their discretion, information or analysis that is of interest to 
another Member State to the FIU of that Member State 
b) promptly forwarding the suspicious transaction reports that concern another Member 
to the FIU of that Member State and  
c) replying to requests from their EU counterparts.  
But how do they actually communicate with each other? Article 56 of the Directive calls on 
FIUs to use ‘protected channels of communication’65 and to that end, encourages them to rely 
on FIU.net, a decentralised computer network that ‘shapes a virtual information cloud between 
the FIUs and their (over 550) distributed government, commercial and public information 
sources and it enables real time analysis of distributed dynamic information and knowledge 
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otherwise legally, organisationally, technically, and/or financially impossible to achieve’.66 
 Without getting into much technical detail, let us gain a better insight into the main 
features of FIU.net. Perhaps the most important feature of the network is its decentralised nature. 
What does this mean? It means that all EU FIUs have their own database, where they store 
suspicious transaction reports. To become a member of the FIU.net, each of those FIUs had to 
connect its internal database to FIU.net. This connection is achieved through an in-house 
(FIU.net) server. So, 27 EU FIUs participating in the network translates into 27 FIU.net servers 
– which explains why FIU.net is described as a decentralized mechanism for data exchange.67 
In other words, there is no central database and no centralized storage of data. Instead, all data 
connected to FIU.net is stored at an FIU.net database located in the premises of individual 
FIUs.68 This structure guarantees that individual FIUs maintain control over their data (e.g. no 
other FIU can access it without their consent) but also a certain level of flexibility when it comes 
to their data governance practices. 69   
 The most well-known feature of FIU.net, however, is the technology that comes with 
it – known as Ma3tch (‘Match three’). This is an analysis tool, promoted as enabling ‘FIUs to 
identify information that before would have remained undetected and there is no need to expose 
any privacy sensitive data’.70 Ma3tch enables FIUs to (as its name suggests) match their data with 
the data of their EU counterparts, in order to determine whether they hold information that is 
of interest to them.71 If there is a positive hit, the FIUs involved will be alerted and follow-up 
on the hit, by sharing the actual personal data.72 As Balboni and Macenaite argue, this ‘privacy 
by design’ solution leads to improved privacy and data protection in the context of FIU 
cooperation, because it ensures that FIUs exchange only that data that is absolutely necessary – 
hence respecting the data protection principle of data minimisation.73 By bringing the 
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information of FIUs together, Ma3tch enables EU FIUs to act ‘as one’ – at least in the virtual 
sphere.74  
 This account may have given the impression that FIU.net and Ma3tch are an integral 
part of all EU FIUs’ daily routines. That, however, has not been the case;75 - although the latest 
AML Directives are bound to change that. 76 To comply with the newly introduced forms of 
FIU cooperation that we explored above, FIUs will have to routinely participate in this virtual 
network. The requirements for joint analysis and cross-border dissemination of STRs are already 
occupying a series of pilot projects under the umbrella of the EU FIUs Platform.77 Given that 
these new forms of cooperation – and especially the requirement to forward reports that concern 
another Member State to the FIU of that Member State -78 impose a heavy workload on FIUs, 
they are keen to exploit the functionalities of FIU.net in order to comply with these 
obligations.79 Despite their ongoing efforts to standardize cross-border dissemination of those 
reports via FIU.net, this functionality is not widely used yet.80 The Commission, who in the 
summer of 2019 reviewed the status of FIU cooperation in the EU, concluded that ‘few 
Member States today comply with their legal obligation to forward or disseminate cross-border 
reports’.81 
 But the far-reaching potential of Ma3tch does not end with cross border reports – or 
joint analysis.82 FIUs can, for instance, use this technology to amalgamate their collective 
knowledge over risks or patterns of behaviour.83 They can also use it for social network analysis, 
in order to identify relationships between entities.84 All these possible additional uses of Ma3tch 
have not gone unnoticed by EU policymakers, who have big plans for FIU.net’s future. In fact, 
the Commission recently noted that  
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The FIU.net should be developed so that the system can be used to extract information and 
statistics on flows of information, activities and the outcomes of analysis. Having relevant, 
reliable, and comparable quantitative data at EU level will contribute to a better understanding 
of the risks and also help the Commission and the Member States to identify sectors that transmit 
few reports on suspected activities or transactions and analyse the reasons why.85  
For most of its lifespan, FIU.net was administered by the Dutch Ministry of Interior,86 with 
the support of a series of grands by the Commission.87 In search for a long term solution, it was 
decided that FIU.net should be embedded in Europol and a Common Understanding was signed 
to that effect in 2013.88 FIU.net was officially integrated in Europol three years later.89 FIUs are 
connected to Europol through the Europol National Units.90 This embedment, high in the list 
of political priorities,91 was promoted as ‘an opportunity for greater operational cooperation 
between FIUs and law enforcement’92 that will benefit investigations into organised crime by 
increasing the ‘synergies between financial and criminal intelligence’.93  
Keen to examine how these synergies might translate into operational terms, in 2017 
Europol launched a pilot project which involved the matching (via FIU.net and Ma3tch) of lists 
of high value targets within EMPACT priority areas94 against the data of seven FIUs.95 There 
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were high hopes for FIU.net’s contribution in the ‘fight’ against terrorist financing as well;96 
according to official statements, the network was set to support the work of Europol’s European 
Counter Terrorism Centre,97 while FIUs would be able to request Europol to conduct searches 
at the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme on their behalf.98 A pilot was launched to that 
effect and in 2016 and 23 Member States gave the go ahead for their FIUs to have direct contact 
with Europol for this purpose.99 These are just some of the pilot projects that were introduced 
following the embedment of FIU.net into Europol in order to explore possible data-driven 
synergies. As we will see in the following section however, all these aspirations came abruptly 
to an end, in the face of data protection considerations.   
In this section, we examined the evolution of the Union’s legal framework on FIU 
cooperation. We saw that, for the most part, FIU cooperation in the EU was governed by a 
patchy legal framework, which developed spasmodically largely in response to the FATF and 
Egmont Group’s standards, and that it took a very long time until the EU legislator eventually 
decided to incorporate a series of substantive provisions on FIU cooperation within the fourth 
(and fifth) AML Directives. These provisions, which introduced several new forms of FIU 
cooperation, are supported by FIU.net and Ma3tch technology, although they are not exploited 
as much as EU policymakers would have liked. All this, however, comes at a cost – an invisible 
cost – for the protection of personal data, which has always been an afterthought throughout 
this evolution. In the following sections, we shall focus on that.  
 
 
 
FIU Cooperation in the EU: Challenges for the Rights to Privacy and Data Protection  
 
Uncertainty over the applicable data protection framework 
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It would not be an overstatement if we claimed that 2018 was the year of data protection in 
the EU. In the spring of that year, the General Data Protection Regulation100 (GDPR) became 
applicable and the deadline for the national transposition of its police and law enforcement 
counterpart – the Police Data Protection Directive101 – expired. So, how does this recent reform 
affect FIU cooperation within the EU? Since FIUs were established, there has been a prevailing 
uncertainty over the data protection framework that governs their cross-border activities.102 
Unfortunately, the recent data protection reform did not bring about any clarity on that front – 
if anything, it has complicated matters.  
Because FIUs in the EU are so diverse, it is not clear whether their domestic data processing 
activities are governed by the GDPR or by the Police Data Protection Directive. The answer 
to this question is not easy. To begin with, Article 41 of the Fourth anti-money laundering 
Directive states that Directive 95/46 (the GDPR’s predecessor) applies to the processing of 
personal data for the purposes of that Directive.103 It also states, however, that the Directive ‘is 
without prejudice to the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters’.104 This caveat leaves us with no conclusive answer as 
to which data protection framework applies to FIUs. This has not gone unnoticed; when the 
European Data Protection Supervisor published his Opinion on the proposed Fourth anti-
money laundering Directive, he suggested that ‘[i]n order to ensure seamless and effective data 
protection, and in view of the legal basis chosen for the Proposals, there should be no doubt 
that the activities of the competent authorities and the FIUs under the proposed Directive will 
only be subject to national provisions implementing Directive 95/46/EC’.105  
The EU legislator, however, did not follow up on the EDPS’ suggestion at the time – which 
might prompt us to conclude that the activities of FIUs were, in the EU legislator’s view, subject 
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to the (now repealed) Framework Decision 2008/977 ‘on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters’.106 There is, 
however, another plausible explanation for the EU legislator’s reluctance to take a stance on this 
matter. Because FIUs come in different models, it is debatable whether the EU legislator can 
determine which data protection framework should apply to FIUs of a law enforcement, 
judicial, or even hybrid nature through a Directive that has been adopted under an internal 
market legal basis. The above-mentioned Framework Decision has now been repealed and 
replaced by the Police Data Protection Directive, but this doesn’t affect our discussion. As the 
following analysis demonstrates, FIUs have struggled over this for some time.  
In March of 2018, two months before the new data protection rules became applicable, the 
EU FIUs Platform raised the matter of the applicable data protection framework in a discussion 
that revealed the divergence of viewpoints between stakeholders.107 For its part, the Commission 
emphasized that ‘as a public administration’ FIUs fall under the GDPR.108 But FIUs were not 
convinced; instead, they expressed concerns as to ‘the applicability of the GDPR versus the 
directive in general and more specifically to administrative FIUs (…)’.109 A few months later, 
the Platform revisited this issue.110 The Commission noted that pursuant to Article 94 of the 
GDPR,111 all references to the (repealed) Data Protection Directive within the anti-money 
laundering Directive are to be read as references to the GDPR. That means, the Commission 
continued, that Article 41 of the AML Directive, which provides that ‘[t]he processing of 
personal data under this Directive is subject to Directive 95/46/EC’ is henceforth to be read 
that the processing is subject to the GDPR. Clearly, the Commission is of the view that Article 
41 covers the processing of data by FIUs.112 Some Member States, however, disagreed with this 
interpretation. 
One member reminded that according to AMLD 32(1) prevention and detection of criminal 
offences is a core responsibility of FIUs, furthermore they use on a very large scale police etc. 
data derived from criminal investigations. Another member referred to that several FIUs are 
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actually law enforcement authorities and that their core business are covered by the Data 
Protection Police Directive.113 
But the Commission did not embrace the view that the processing of data by FIUs falls within 
the law enforcement sphere. In its opinion, the fact that some of them have law enforcement 
status is not enough for the Police Data Protection Directive to be applicable.114 For the latter 
to apply, both the personal and material scope must be fulfilled – and even if an FIU satisfies the 
personal scope (ie if it qualifies as a ‘competent authority’ for the purposes of the Police Data 
Protection Directive), the Commission believes that carrying out analysis of suspicious 
transaction reports does not satisfy the material scope of the Directive – that is, the requirement 
that the data is processed for the purposes of preventing, detecting or suppressing crime.115  
Clearly, this issue calls for some debate. Just as the European Data Protection Supervisor 
before it, the Commission seems determined to steer Member States towards applying the 
GDPR to their FIUs – but is this really the appropriate legal framework for them? First of all, 
not all of them qualify as ‘public administration’ – as the Commission described them. And 
second, even the FIUs that do qualify as administration might not necessarily fall under the 
GDPR’s scope – and vice versa. For instance, the Greek FIU (which is a hybrid FIU)116 applies 
the GDPR.117 But the UK FIU also applies the GDPR – even through it is a law enforcement-
type FIU.118 Not all FIUs have opted for the GDPR though; Luxembourg’s (judicial) FIU 
applies the Police Data Protection Directive.119 This serves to illustrate that not all EU FIUs 
abide by the same data protection instrument. And when it comes to information exchanges 
between them, this complicates matters significantly.  
It complicates them because the GDPR and the Police Data Protection Directive offer 
different degrees of protection when it comes to the processing of personal data. So when an 
EU FIU that applies the GDPR shares personal data with an EU counterpart that applies the 
Directive instead, the data in question is transferred to an environment that offers, at least to 
some extent, watered down protections compared to those offered where the data was collected 
in the first place. A detailed overview of the differences between the two legal instruments is 
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beyond the scope of this article – but it is important that we highlight some of the differences 
that are relevant for the purposes of our analysis.120  
 With regards to data protection principles, the Directive does not require the processing 
of personal data to be transparent, whereas the GDPR does.121 It also does not prohibit ‘further 
processing’ of data in the same way that the GDPR does: whereas the latter prohibits further 
processing of data for purposes other than those they were collected,122 the Directive permits 
subsequent processing (by the same or another controller) if the controller is authorized do so 
and the processing is necessary and proportionate.123 The Directive’s take on the principle of 
data minimization also diverges from its ‘first pillar’ counterpart, so as to provide law 
enforcement authorities with more flexibility; according to the Directive, personal data must be 
‘adequate,  relevant and  not  excessive’,124  whereas  under the GDPR,  they must be ‘adequate,  
relevant and  limited  to what is necessary’.125 Principles aside, there are also important differences 
when it comes to the data subjects’ rights. First of all, the Directive does not provide for a right 
to be forgotten or the right to data portability. Second, the rights to information,126 access,127 
and rectification or erasure128 are considerably limited under the Directive when compared to 
the GDPR. In particular, the Directive allows Member States to restrict them in order to a) 
avoid obstructing official or legal inquiries, investigations or procedures, b) to avoid prejudicing 
the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, c) to protect public security, d) national security and e) the rights and 
freedoms of others.129 Those rights can, of course, also be limited under the GDPR, but in the 
Directive’s case there is understandably more room for limitations. For example, if a person is 
under investigation and files a subject access request with a law enforcement authority, they are 
likely to receive a ‘nor confirm nor deny’ type of response.  
 That said, we must also keep in mind that the Directive only provides a minimum level 
of harmonization; chances are, therefore, that additional divergences exist, depending on how 
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Member States have chosen to implement it. All things considered, it seems clear that a Member 
State’s choice to apply one or the other data protection instrument has real consequences for 
data subjects. And if we take into account that EU FIUs exchange large amounts of personal 
data on a routine basis, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that their cooperation continues 
to takes place – despite the recent data protection reform - under an uneven legal framework 
that undermines the protection of personal data.  
 To resolve this, I would argue that Member States should subject their FIUs to the same 
data protection framework – despite their institutional differences. This inevitably raises the 
question as to which is the most appropriate framework for FIUs – the GDPR or the Police 
Data Protection Directive. In the following section, I will argue that - in contrast to the 
Commission’s view – Member States should subject their FIUs to the Police Data Protection 
Directive.  
 
The Case for Subjecting FIUs to the Police Data Protection Directive  
 
 In order for the Directive to be applicable, two requirements must be met. The first is 
the material scope: the processing of personal data must take place for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public 
security.130 But the presence of the material scope alone is not enough; for the Directive to 
apply, the processing in question must be carried out by a competent authority (personal scope). 
A competent authority is, according to the Directive,  
(a) any public authority competent for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and 
the prevention of threats to public security;   
b) or any other body or entity entrusted by Member State law to exercise public authority and 
public powers for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and 
the prevention of threats to public security.131 
The question before us therefore, is whether the processing of data by EU FIUs satisfies those 
two requirements.  
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 Let us begin our analysis with the material scope - the prevention, investigation, 
detection and suppression of crime. The purpose of the FIU, according  to the latest anti-money 
laundering Directive, ‘is to collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim 
of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to 
prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and to disseminate the results of 
its analysis as well as additional information to the competent authorities where there are grounds 
to suspect money laundering, associated predicate offences or financing of terrorism.’132 In light 
of this, it is difficult to argue that the processing of data by FIUs does not satisfy the material 
scope of the Police Data Protection Directive.133 For the Commission, however, this is not a 
clear-cut matter; as I mentioned earlier, in a recent meeting of the EU FIUs platform, its 
representatives argued that FIU analysis does not necessarily satisfy the material scope of 
preventing, detecting or supressing crime.134 Given that the sole purpose of analysis is to identify 
connections between suspicious financial flows, money laundering and terrorist financing, I find 
the Commission’s argument hard to sustain. Earlier Commission documents even contradict its 
current stance; the 2010 Communication on information management in the area of freedom, 
security and justice mentions the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (now replaced 
by the Police Data Protection Directive), the Council of Europe Convention 108 and the 
Council of Europe Police Recommendation R87 as the applicable data protection framework 
to FIU cooperation, including FIU.net.135 Nonetheless, in its latest report on FIU cooperation, 
the Commission clearly stated that FIUs must abide by the GDPR’s requirements.136 At the 
same time, however, it acknowledged that ‘[d]espite this clear obligation, most FIUs apply the 
Police Data Protection Directive (…) instead or both the General Data Protection Regulation 
and the Police Data Protection Directive’.137  Clearly, there is some controversy as to the 
appropriate framework for FIUs – and not all Member States see eye to eye with the 
Commission.  
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 What complicates matters further, however, is whether FIUs satisfy the personal scope 
requirement; can we convincingly argue that all EU FIUs, irrespective of their status, satisfy the 
definition of competent authorities under the Directive?138 In short, this is for the Member States 
to decide – and clearly the majority of them have decided that indeed they do. But their decision 
is not necessarily linked to the status of the FIU; the UK, for instance, decided to subject its 
FIU to the GDPR – despite the fact that the UK FIU is a police-type FIU, housed under the 
National Crime Agency. But a 2014 report about the UK’s block opt-out of pre-Lisbon criminal 
law and policing measures, the European Scrutiny Committee examined (among other things) 
under which data protection framework the UK FIU would exchange information with its 
counterparts if they opted out of the Council Decision 2000/642/JHA (on FIU cooperation).139 
During this discussion, it was suggested that the UK FIU could perhaps continue to exchange 
information under a police-to-police framework – applying the so-called Swedish initiative140 
that governs information exchanges between law enforcement authorities. The government 
noted, however, that while the UK FIU would fit within the definition of a law enforcement 
authority, other FIUs would not.141 Nonetheless, a few years later, the UK government  decided 
that its FIU is more akin to administration and that the GDPR is the appropriate instrument to 
regulate its activities. 
These inconsistencies serve to demonstrate that EU FIUs sit in the grey zone between 
administration and law enforcement. In other words, they sit in the zone between the former 
first and third pillar – and neither the Member States nor the EU legislator seem to be able to 
agree as to where their nature lies. But this ambivalence comes at the expense of legal certainty, 
because it is not clear which data protection framework governs their cooperation - at a time 
when, as we have seen, they become more and more interconnected. This dilemma raises a 
broader question: in cases where the lines between law enforcement and the administrative (or 
private) sector are blurred, how should the applicable data protection framework be determined? 
Should it be determined by reference to the nature of the data controller (are they a ‘competent 
authority’ or not?), or by reference to the (law enforcement) purpose of the data processing?   
 
138 Article 3 (7), Police Data Protection Directive.  
139 House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, The UK’s block opt-out of pre-Lisbon criminal law and 
policing measures: Government Response to the Committee's Twenty- first Report of Session 2013–14 (2013-
2014 HC 978), 45 (emphasis added).  
140 Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information 
and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union [2006] OJ L 
386/89.  
141 House of Commons (n 139).  
Similar dilemmas have been raised when private entities are called upon to transfer data 
to public authorities for law enforcement and public security purposes – or to retain data so that 
the authorities can access them. In 2006, the CJEU dealt with the legal basis of the Council 
Decision on the Passenger Name Records Agreement between the EU and the US,142 a post 
9/11 measure which required airline companies to transfer passenger data to the US Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection.143 In this context, the Commission adopted a data protection 
adequacy decision under the (now repealed) Data Protection Directive. The CJEU held that 
the (‘first-pillar’) legal bases (current Art 114 TFEU and the Data Protection Directive) that 
those two decisions were adopted under were not appropriate, because the data processing 
operations related to matters of public security and law enforcement.144 According to the CJEU, 
the transfers of data by private entities to public authorities for law enforcement purposes fell 
outside the scope of the (former) Data Protection Directive.145 So, even though the data were 
initially collected in a commercial context and the data controller was a private entity, it was the 
purpose of the processing (public security and law enforcement) that determined the applicable 
data protection framework.146  
But that criterion doesn’t always prevail. Soon after the PNR judgement, the Data 
Retention Directive, a first-pillar measure that obliged electronic communication service 
providers to retain data ‘in order to ensure that the data are available for the purpose of the 
investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime’, 147 was challenged on the ground that 
it was not adopted under the appropriate legal basis.148 In this instance, the CJEU did not follow 
the PNR judgment’s logic. Instead, it held that the data retention obligations imposed by this 
Directive, even though they served crime-fighting purposes, were rightly based on the first 
pillar, because they covered the activities of service providers in the internal market.149 The 
decision of the court in this instance has been criticised for creating an artificial distinction 
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between the storage of data for law enforcement purposes on the one hand, and the access and 
further processing of that data by the (law enforcement) authorities.150  
To complicate matters further, in Tele2/Sverige, the court decided that national law 
which was based on Article 15(1) of the E-privacy Directive (which allows Member States to 
restrict some of the rights provided by the Directive for crime fighting purposes by, among 
other things, adopting data retention rules) and provided for the retention and access to data by 
public authorities for law enforcement purposes, fell within the scope of the E-privacy 
Directive.151 In this instance the CJEU did not separate between retention and access 
‘since data is retained only for the purpose, when necessary, of making that data 
accessible to the competent national authorities, national legislation that imposes the 
retention of data necessarily entails, in principle, the existence of provisions relating 
to access by the competent national authorities to the data retained by the providers 
of electronic communications services’.152 
As Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe remarked in his Opinion on the so-called ‘Schrems 
II’ case, these two approaches are somehow conflicting.153 This illustrates the dilemmas that arise 
when attempting to determine the data protection framework that governs transfers of data from 
‘first pillar’ to  ‘third pillar’ entities – or even beyond, in the realm of national security. The case 
of FIU cooperation is no exception, since, as we saw earlier, some FIUs are subject to the 
GDPR. If we take into account the PNR case, which mostly concerned data transfers, and 
considering that the recent Directive on law enforcement access to financial information, which 
includes (limited) provisions on FIU cooperation was adopted under Article 87(2) TFEU (which 
enables the Union to adopt measures on, among others, the exchange of information to facilitate 
police cooperation among Member States’ competent authorities, including police, customs and 
other specialised law enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection and 
investigation of criminal offences) I would argue that the more appropriate data protection 
framework to govern the exchange of information between FIUs is the Police Data Protection 
Directive – and not its internal market counterpart. 
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 The Integration of FIU.net into Europol: Data Protection Challenges 
 
The lack of clarity over the data protection framework that regulates information 
exchanges between EU FIUs is not the only issue that creates problems from a data protection 
perspective. In the previous section, I mentioned that despite the aspiring synergies between 
criminal and financial intelligence that would be developed by FIU.net’s embedment into 
Europol, the curtain on that fell too soon. This happened in December of 2019, when the EDPS 
put an abrupt end to the embedment of FIU.net in Europol.154 In order to understand why this 
happened, we need to take a closer look into the details of this arrangement. I will endeavour 
to do so without going into much technical detail.  
In 2013, EU FIUs and Europol agreed upon a Common Understanding on the 
embedment of FIU.net into Europol.155 As Europol noted at the time,  
in order to realise the full potential of operational synergies between Europol and FIUs, the 
network facilitating information exchange between FIUs (FIU.NET) will be replaced by SIENA 
and the services of the FIU.NET Bureau will be fully embedded within Europol (including the 
staff of the FIU.NET Bureau). Remaining details around governance, data processing and FIU 
activities will be addressed with view to achieving more operational added value from linking 
general money flows to criminal activities and following up to identified links.156  
The embedment process took effect in January 2016 and a Service Level Agreement, 
outlining how Europol was to sustain the FIU.net was concluded in October of the same year.157 
FIUs are connected to Europol through the Europol National Units.158 Needless to say, the 
embedment process proved both legally and technically complicated and a lot of obstacles 
emerged along the way - even before the EDPS delivered the final blow. More specifically, the 
FIU.net’s full integration with SIENA (that is, replacing the network by SIENA) that was 
referred to in the Common Understanding, proved very challenging – which is why the FIUs 
Platform and Europol agreed to proceed in smaller steps, and considered whether 
interoperability between FIU.net and  SIENA might be a more appropriate first step.159  
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In any event, and given that FIU.net had to be upgraded as a system, Europol presented in 
2017 a proposed Roadmap for the network’s future.160 The proposal envisaged a move towards 
a centralised system (recall that FIU.net is a decentralised network) and in particular towards 
centralised sharing but decentralised matching of information.161 On that note, some participants 
of the Platform raised concerns about retaining control of their own data.162 In response to that,  
Europol remarked that it is a cooperation partner (which meant that it was up to FIUs to choose 
whether to share information with Europol), but  also a service provider at the same time – and 
that the proposed Roadmap ‘does not suggest that FIUs give access to each other's databases 
(even if FIU at some point in time would like to share more information) or act against their 
national data protection rules’.163 
 Some FIUs, however, did not view the proposal positively and raised a series data protection 
concerns – mainly around storage of data, noting that the Fourth anti-money laundering 
Directive ‘does not provide the legal basis to transfer STR data to a database other than an FIU 
one.164 In other words, some FIUs stressed out that during the ‘analysis’ phase, data from 
suspicious transaction reports can only be shared between FIUs; in their view, unless the FIU 
decides (following its analysis) that the suspicion is indeed substantiated and that the information 
must be shared with law enforcement, data can only travel from FIU to FIU and cannot be 
stored at a law enforcement database (such as Europol’s).165  
In light of those objections, Europol and FIUs begun working towards a revised Roadmap, 
but they also sought the advice of the EDPS and the Europol Cooperation Board166 on the data 
protection issues that were raised.167 Interestingly, it was not the processing of data by Europol 
in its capacity as a cooperation partner that raised concerns for the EDPS; rather, it was the 
processing of data in its capacity as a service provider and technical administrator of the FIU.net. 
More specifically, the issue was whether the processing of FIU data that accompanied the 
maintenance of FIU.net complied with the data processing requirements of the Europol 
Regulation.  
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According to that Regulation, Europol may process personal data for the purposes of: 
a) cross-checking aimed at identifying connections or other relevant links between information 
related to: 
i. persons who are suspected of having committed or taken part in a criminal offence in respect 
of which Europol is competent, or who have been convicted of such an offence; 
ii. persons regarding whom there are factual indications or reasonable grounds to believe that 
they will commit criminal offences in respect of which Europol is competent; 
b) analyses of a strategic or thematic nature; 
c) operational analyses; 
d) facilitating the exchange of information between Member States, Europol, other Union 
bodies, third countries and international organisations.168 
Annex II of the Europol Regulation further lists the specific categories of personal data that may 
be processed for the above purposes.169 The maintenance of FIU.net arguably falls under d) – 
facilitating information exchanges. The key question, therefore, is whether the processing of 
FIU data in this context falls within the categories of data that may be collected and processed 
for the purposes of facilitating information exchange, as listed by Annex II of the Regulation.170 
According to this list, such personal data must relate to (among others) ‘persons who, pursuant 
to the national law of the Member State concerned, are suspected of having committed or 
having taken part in a criminal offence in respect of which Europol is competent, or who have 
been convicted of such an offence.’171  
It is the word ‘suspected’ that brings us to the heart of the matter. FIUs deal with 
suspicious transaction reports - but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they deal with suspects. 
According to the EDPS, for Europol to comply with the aforementioned requirements, the 
individuals involved in suspicious transactions would have to qualify as ‘suspects’.172 But, as he 
rightly pointed out, FIUs ‘act before the start of any criminal proceeding or investigation has 
begun’.173 The Europol Regulation does not define ‘suspect’ – this is a matter of national law. 
In light of this, the Europol Cooperation Board issued an opinion in September 2019, which 
advised that FIU.net could not benefit from Europol’s technical infrastructure, because the 
categories of data processed ‘do not seem consistent with Europol’s mandate’.174 Following that, 
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the EDPS published its decision in December of the same year; he concluded that the data 
processing carried out by Europol in the context of the technical operation of the FIU.net 
breached the Europol Regulation and therefore, he imposed a ban on those processing 
operations.175 Given the importance of FIU.net for information exchanges between EU FIUs, 
the ban was suspended until December 2020, to allow time for moving FIU.net to another host 
organisation.176   
 In other words, Europol, in its capacity as a technical administrator of FIU.net, has been 
processing FIU data in the absence of a legal basis that enabled it to do so – in breach of the 
Europol Regulation. This is one more instance where the need to secure an operationally 
convenient arrangement for information exchanges side-lined data protection considerations.  
 
Conclusion  
 
 FIUs may belong in the broader ‘policing’ sphere, but in reality, they are stuck in the 
middle between the (former) first and third pillars. They might have been established by a first 
pillar instrument (the AML Directive), but their functions are more closely connected to the 
field of crime prevention rather than the internal market. The ‘grey zone’ where FIUs operate 
has generated significant difficulties in determining the data protection instrument that should 
govern their domestic activities. Some FIUs are governed the GDPR, while others by its law 
enforcement counterpart. And this choice is not necessarily determined by the nature of the 
FIU. As we saw, there are police FIUs who apply the GDPR. In this article I have argued that, 
contrary to the Commission’s opinion, the Police Data Protection Directive is a more 
appropriate legal framework for them. Currently, FIUs are holding discussions under the 
umbrella of the EU FIUs Platform on this matter – and it seems that several Member States have 
subjected their FIUs to the Police Data Protection Directive. But so long as these divergencies 
exist, there is an uneven playing in field in the protection guaranteed to the personal data of 
individuals.  
It is not just the quality of the FIU nature that is ambiguous. Their activities, too, evolved 
in a piecemeal manner – even more so when it comes to their transnational activities. As we 
saw, the transfers of data between them are regulated by multiple instruments. If we add to that 
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the uncertainty over the data protection framework that applies to their cooperation, the 
persistent calls for maximum information exchange, and the novel forms of FIU cooperation 
envisaged by the EU legislator, it becomes clear that FIU cooperation presents several challenges 
for the protection of personal data. A first step to overcoming them would be to clarify the data 
protection framework that should be applicable to their transnational activities.  
But this is not the only challenge from a data protection perspective. As the example of 
FIU.net’s integration into Europol illustrated, when policymakers are fixated with improving 
the operational cooperation of EU FIUs, data protection considerations may easily fall through 
the cracks. Europol was processing FIU data in its capacity as the technical administrator of the 
FIU.net since 2016, in the absence of a legal basis for that processing – in breach of  the Europol 
Regulation. But given the large amounts of personal and financial data that is regularly 
exchanged between EU FIUs, data that also belong to innocent individuals, data protection 
should not be side-lined.  
 
 
 
 
